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CONSTRUCTION LENDERS' LIABILITY TO
CONTRACTORS, SUBCONTRACTORS,
AND MATERIALMEN
CURTIS R. IREITZ t
The nature of private ordering, which lies at the heart of our
idea of contract, necessarily implies that two parties deal with each
other, in order to strike a bargain, by shaping their agreement. This
is reflected in the traditional notion that contracts create rights and
duties only for parties who are in privity with each other.' This
legal concept is no longer as well accepted as it once may have been.2
f Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. A.B. 1951, LL.B. 1956, Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania. The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance
of Gunther 0. Carrle, J.D. 1980, University of Pennsylvania. An earlier version of
this article was published as chapter nine of CONSTRUCrION LTATrON (K. Cush-
man ed. 1981).
1 Fundamental as it is to the idea of agreement, the notion of privity never-
theless does not feature in doctrinal statements about contract law in the United
States. Historically, British law declares that a promise is unenforceable unless
consideration moves from the promisee to the promisor. Dunlap Pneumatic Tyre
Co. v. Selfridge & Co., 1915 A.C. 847 (P.C.); A.G. GUEST, ANSON'S LAw OF CON-
TRACT 95-96 (25th ed. 1979); G.H. TRErrEL, THE LAw OF CONTRACT 62-64 (5th
ed. 1979). The effect of this doctrine is substantially to restrict contract disputes to
persons who have bargained with each other.
The British view of consideration did not take hold in the United States. The
1932 Restatement explicitly rejected the privity aspect of consideration and
this position is reaffirmed in the new Restatement: "The performance or
return promise may be given to the promisor or to some other person. It
may be given by the promisee or by some other person." REsTATEmENT
(SEcOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71(4) (1981). Without limits derived from considera-
tion, American law has had to decide, using other doctrinal language, who may
enforce a contractual promise. Privity concepts have not developed a single focus.
Aspects of privity can be detected by inference in doctrines dealing with formation,
modification, and discharge. More overt are the elements of privity in the law of
agency (which some would characterize as independent of contracts) and of assign-
ments. The aspect of contract law most commonly identified as dealing with matters
of privity is the law relating to third party beneficiaries.
The Second Restatement includes the following illustration, pertinent to the
subject of this Article, in its treatment of the law of third party beneficiaries: "A
contracts to erect a building for C. B then contracts with A to supply lumber
needed for the building. C is an incidental beneficiary of B's promise [to supply
lumber], and B is an incidental beneficiary of C's promise to pay A for the building."
RESTATEmENT (SEcOND) OF CoNTr ACTs § 302 illustration 19 (1981). Accord 4
A. CoPBIN, CoaBnm ON CONTRACTS § 778 (1951); see also RESTATEMENT OF REST-
TUTION § 110 (1937).2 One major development, the right of "intended beneficiaries" to enforce con-
tractual promises, is now well known in this country, RESTATMAENT (SECOND) OF
Cor ACTs § 302 (1981), although scholars continue to seek a fully satisfying
rationale for this position.
Another development relaxing privity requirements involved implied quality
warranties in the sale of goods. Some persons remote from a seller have been
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In a number of transactional settings, courts have been willing to
consider contract disputes despite lack of privity between the parties.
This Article will consider one of these settings, suits against con-
struction lenders by contractors, subcontractors, and materialmen.
Construction lending plays a vital role in private construction
projects3 Developers typically provide a small fraction of the
needed investment, and permanent lenders, secured by long-term
mortgages, ordinarily do not extend credit until projects have been
completed and begun operating. Construction lenders fill the short-
term credit needs of developers as construction projects proceed.
When the project is finished, the construction lender is repaid from
the proceeds of the permanent mortgage loan. A construction
lender who does not intend to provide long-term credit will see to
it that there is also a permanent mortgage "take-out" 4 commitment
at the outset.
A construction loan generally is committed before the project
gets underway, and typically provides for payments to the developer
in installments as the work progresses. Prudent lenders arrange the
pay-out schedule so that the value of the work in place at any time
exceeds the sums advanced by the lenders. As security for the loan,
construction lenders take mortgages on the real property; thus, the
granted relief in such cases. The original breakthrough allowed persons who had
suffered personal injuries from defective food or drink to sue the manufacturers,
see, e.g., Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828
(1942); Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633 (1913), although some
courts stoutly resisted this development, see, e.g., Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., 235
N.Y. 468, 139 N.E. 576 (1923). In 1960, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
widened the category of personal injury-implied warranty cases beyond food and
drink Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
In that same year, Prosser published a very influential article seeking to shift the
basis of these personal injury cases from contract to tort. Prosser, The Assault Upon
the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960). Four
years later, this view was advanced by the Restatement (Second) of Torts inclusion
of § 402A. That provision has been enthusiastically embraced by state courts. See
Reitz & Seabolt, Warranties and Product Liability: Who Can Sue and Where?, 46
Thu=r L.Q. 527 (1973). Acceptance of the new tort largely eclipsed the need
for injured persons to seek a contract remedy, but strict tort liability, as defined by
the Restatement, did not encompass economic loss. Courts have divided on the
privity requirement in warranty claims for economic losses. Compare, e.g., Davis v.
Homasote Co., 281 Or. 383, 574 P.2d 1116 (1978) (requiring privity) with Morrow
v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976) and Seely v. White Motor
Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965) and Santor v. A. & M.
Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965) (not requiring privity).
3 Keenan, The Importance of Construction Lending, in PRACTsN LAw INsnr-
TrTE, CoNsTRucnioN LENDING 11 (1973).
4A "take-out" commitment is a promise by a lender to make a long-term loan
on the property when construction is completed by the developer. See G. OsBonE,
G. NmSON & D. WTmAN, EnaxL EsTATE FINANCE LAw 721 (3d ed. 1979) [here-
inafter cited as G. OSBORNE].
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foreclosure value of the security effectively rises as the work proceeds
toward completion.
If all goes well, the construction loan and the developer's in-
vestment together will be sufficient to pay the prime contractor, who
in turn will pay subcontractors and materials suppliers, and so on
down through lower tiers of suppliers of labor or materials. Un-
fortunately, in a great many instances all does not go well. The
causes of construction project failures are many and varied, as are
the circumstances that exist when work is halted. Frequently, in
the wake of failure, there are unpaid claims for work done on pro-
jects by prime contractor or by those in lower echelons of supply
of labor or materials. It is these unpaid claims that are the subject
of this Article.
Construction lenders who are in contract privity only with de-
velopers do not see themselves as contractually involved with these
other claimants. Lenders ordinarily take the position that payment
of a prime contractor is the developer's obligation, an obligation not
pertaining to the lender. Suppliers on lower tiers of the contracting
pyramid are even more remote from the lenders in the sense of con-
tract privity. Increasingly, however, unpaid claimants are seeking to
recover in direct actions against construction lenders. And courts
increasingly are upholding these claims.5 This Article will examine
the extent to which judicial relaxation of a contract privity require-
ment in numerous jurisdictions has increased the scope of construc-
tion lender liability.
Unpaid suppliers of labor or materials usually seek recovery
from construction lenders because no effective remedy is available
from developers, who often have become hopelessly insolvent."
Moreover, effective mechanics' lien protection may also be non-
existent, as a result of either preperformance waivers or subordina-
tion of liens to those of the construction lender's mortgages.
Construction lenders are fully aware at the outset that as the
projects proceed there may be unpaid contractors, subcontractors,
and materialmen. Therefore, they arrange to have their mortgages
the senior liens on the property to be improved. Thus, their se-
5 See infra notes 49-109 and accompanying text.
6 Assuming it was practical to seek recovery from a developer, there would be
no privity problem for those with whom the developer dealt directly. In the
ordinary developer-prime' contractor-subcontractors and materialmen pyramid, how-
ever, subcontractors and materialmen, as well as those on lower tiers, lack contract
privity with the developer. The basic legal devices for resolving claims in such
suits are discussed in this Article. See infra notes 65-126 and accompanying text.
For a review of cases in which remote parties have sued a developer or owner, see
Gee v. Eberle, 279 Pa. Super. Ct. 101, 115-20, 420 A.2d 1050, 1058-60 (1980).
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curity for advances to the developer cannot be impaired by other
liens arising later.
Lenders may also take steps to ensure that those who have sup-
plied labor or materials receive payment for the work done. To
minimize risks that would be incurred if construction loan proceeds
were simply turned over to a developer, who might dissipate them
without paying the prime contractor, some loan agreements provide
for payment directly to the prime contractor, or to the developer
and prime contractor as. joint payees.7 A more elaborate scheme
sometimes extends further to provide for payments directly to sub-
contractors and materialmen, normally on the basis of approved
vouchers certifying that their respective .performances have been
satisfactorily completed." When sophisticated disbursement pro-
cedures of this kind are used, construction lenders often deposit the
construction loan funds with a disbursement agent-frequently a title
insurance company-which then administers the receipt of the
vouchers and the distribution of the payments.9
Similar protection that is less expensive to administer can be
obtained by conditioning payment of construction loan installments
7 The endorsements of all payees are necessary to authorize payment of such a
check. See, e.g., Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 63 Ohio St. 2d 220, 407
N.E.2d 519 (1980).
8 Several states have statutes designed to avoid diversion of funds by the prime
contractor. These statutes designate the payments as trust funds that the prime
contractor, as trustee, must pay to those whose work generated the funds. Sanctions
against contractors for breach of trust vary from state to state. See J. SWEET, LEGAL
ASPECTS or ACHI TECTrE, ENGINEERING AND THE CONSTRUCTION PROCESS 472-73
(2d ed. 1977). Attempts to use these statutes to hold lenders liable to unpaid
claimants have failed. See, e.g., Koppers Co. v. Garling & Langlois, 594 F.2d 1094
(6th Cir. 1979) (applying Michigan law); First Nat'l State Bank of N.J. v. Carlyle
House, Inc., 102 NJ. Super. 300, 246 A.2d 22 (Ch. Div. 1968); Caledonia Lumber
& Coal v. Chili Heights Apartments, 70 App. Div. 2d 766, 417 N.Y.S.2d 536 (1979);
In re ALB Contracting Co. v. York-Jersey Mortgage Co., 60 App. Div. 2d 989, 401
N.Y.S.2d 934 (1978); Shankle Equip. Co. v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 569
P.2d 965 (Okla. 1977); Knight Constr. Co. v. Barnett Mortgage Trust, 572 S.W.2d
381 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
Breach of trust and breach of an escrow agreement have been asserted from
time to time in states that do not have trust fund legislation; these contentions have
been given short shrift See, e.g., Lummus Supply Co. v. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 141 Ca. App. 831, 234 S.E.2d 671 (1977); Koppers Co., 594 F.2d at 1094;
Mortgage Assocs., Inc. v. Monona Shores, Inc., 47 Wis. 2d 171, 177 N.W.2d 340
(1970).
9 Title insurance is often purchased to insure against any encumbrance being
superior to the lien of a construction lender's mortgage. As progress payments are
made, the title insurance company is asked to update its policy to protect against
intervening liens. See Eagan, Viewpoint of Title Company, in PRAcTsING LAW
INSTITUTE, CONSTRUCTION LENDING 335, 338-40 (1973); Healey, The Role of the
Title Insurer in Connection with the Making of a Construction Loan, in PRacTsNG
LAW INsTrrUE, CONSTRUcTION LENDING 357, 361-64 (1973); Keenan, supra note 3,
at 16-17.
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on presentation of signed receipts of the contractor, subcontractors,
or materialmen whose completed work warrants the developer's
claim for another progress payment. This scheme requires either
that the developer have sufficient cash to pay the suppliers before
receiving a pay-out from the construction loan, or that the suppliers
involved be persuaded to sign receipts for sums not yet received on
the faith that the released loan proceeds will be applied promptly
to their ,claims.
Another way that lenders minimize the risks of unpaid claim-
ants who later might seek some remedy against them is to require,
at the outset, the commitment of a payment bond surety to act if the
contractor fails to pay subcontractors or materialmen. Payment
bonds are commonly required in construction ventures, whether by
law as in public projects or by prudential concern in private
projects. 10 Sureties called upon to perform, however, may turn out
to be substituted as the claimants seeking relief from lenders."' If,
however, a lender was the beneficiary, or one of the beneficiaries, of
the surety contract, an action over would not lie. Lenders seeking
this protection, therefore, would be well advised to see that their
status as beneficiaries of these secondary obligations is made explicit.
Experienced contractors and suppliers are also aware from the
beginning that construction projects are risky ventures. A contrac-
tor, if doubtful of a developer's creditworthiness, may have enough
bargaining leverage to negotiate for someone to guarantee the de-
veloper's performance. Alternatively, and perhaps more realistically,
the contractor may bargain for direct payment of construction loan
funds as work progresses, so that the developer cannot divert or hold
back on payments. Those on lower contracting tiers may be able
to insist on a payment bond being obtained, and often are covered
by disbursement schemes that assure the flow of funds into the
hands of the persons performing the work.
In a great many projects, however, there will not be such pro-
tective devices. Contractors, subcontractors, and materialmen, with
varying levels of business sophistication, are aware of the role of
construction loan commitments and look to that source for eventual
payment. Skeptical contractors or suppliers may want to be in-
formed by the developer or by the lender of the size and terms of a
loan commitment. If the doubts are serious enough, potential con-
'0 Guaranty contracts are also regular aspects of transactions involving thinly
capitalized corporations.
"1 See, e.g., Fred S. Conrad Constr. Co. v. Continental Assurance Co., 215 So. 2d
45 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (performance bond surety subrogated to cause of
action of prime contractor against construction lender).
[Vol 130:'416
CONSTRUCTION LENDERS' LIABILITY
tractors or suppliers may want more than information; they may
seek to be included in some fashion as beneficiaries of a loan com-
mitment. These are the kinds of factual ingredients that make up
the grist for subsequent litigation over unpaid claims for work done
or for materials supplied to a building project.
Another related set of cases arises out of events occurring in the
course of performance when the signals of project failure begin to
flash. Contractors and suppliers who have been performing without
being paid according to the progress payment schedule, or who are
alarmed in other ways, may be concerned about continuing per-
formance in the face of a risk of nonpayment even for work already
done. Here again, communications with a construction lender
may give rise to claims for relief in court.
A substantial number of decisions have been rendered in favor
of unpaid suppliers of labor and materials against construction
lenders despite the absence of contract privity. In this Article, we
will review those cases and the legal theories employed in determin-
ing whether to ignore the contract privity requirement and impose
liability.
Before turning to an examination of the existing state of the
law, it is well to note that this Article deals primarily with construc-
tion projects in the private sector. A quite different pattern of
financing and contracting occurs when the owner-developer is a
public entity.12 Governments do not borrow money for their capi-
tal purchases, at least not on a single-project basis, and mortgages
are not permitted on government-owned works. A hybrid form of
public and private construction has emerged under the National
Housing Act.13 The special problems created by this blending of
public and private resources are addressed briefly below.14
12 In construction projects in the public sector, general contractors often obtain
loans with repayment secured by assignment of forthcoming payments from the
governmental agency. Such arrangements may come within article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code. Spurlin v. Sloan, 368 S.W.2d 314 (Ky. 1963). Contracts in-
volving the United States are subject to the limitations of the Assignment of Claims
Act, 41 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
The common requirements of performance and payment bonds in public sector
construction projects diminish the possible need of suppliers of labor and materials
to look to the construction lender for payment. There are, however, often clashes
between sureties and lenders over the retainages or holdbacks payable by the
government upon completion of the project. See, e.g., National Shawmut Bank of
Boston v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 411 F.2d 843 (1st Cir. 1969); Speidel, "Stake-
holder" Payments Under Federal Construction Contracts, 47 VA. L. REv. 640
(1961); see also Dauer, Government Contractors, Commercial Banks and Miller Act
Bond Sureties-A Question of Priorities, 14 B.C. IND. & Comm. L. Rxv. 943 (1973).
'3 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1707 to 1715z-11 (1976).
14 See infra text accompanying notes 117-22.
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I. TRADITIONAL PIVITY REQUIREMENTS SATISFIED
Typically, construction lenders contract directly with devel-
opers. It is possible, however, for those lenders also to establish
contractual relationships with contractors, subcontractors, and ma-
terialmen in which the traditional requirements of contract privity
are satisfied. Such contractual relationships can be created .either
before work commences on a project or during the course of per-
formance. Thus, a construction loan agreement might make sup-
pliers of labor or materials third party beneficiaries with power to
enforce the lender's commitment. Alternatively, a construction
lender might become a guarantor of the developer's obligation to
pay the contractor, or of the contractor's obligation to pay a sub-
contractor. Finally, a lender might independently promise a con-
tractor or supplier that it will be paid, under circumstances that
create a right of the contractor or supplier to recover on promissory
estoppel. Although these are not the ordinary patterns of relation-
ships between construction lenders and contractors, subcontractors,
and materialmen, when the necessary factual elements are found, a
relationship based upon contractual privity can be established.15
15 Similarly, contractors or suppliers may recover in tort actions against con-
struction lenders. If a construction lender has made a material misrepresentation
of fact to a contractor or supplier, such as an overstatement of the balance of a loan
commitment, and the contractor or supplier has acted in reliance on that misrepre-
sentation, the elements of an actionable tort may be found. In some circumstances,
a duty to use reasonable care in the pay-out of funds may be found to exist for the
benefit of contractors or suppliers, and breach of that duty may allow recovery in
an action for negligence.
Unpaid contractors and suppliers have sought recovery on these and othcr
legal theories that do not require contract privity. See, e.g., Cook v. Citizens Say.
& Loan Ass'n, 346 So. 2d 370 (Miss. 1977). In Cook, a prime contractor recovered
from the construction lender on a theory that the lender, in disbursing funds, had a
duty to the contractor to take care that the developer-borrower did not dissipate the
money. The project involved construction of a pre-engineered steel building.
Unlike the other cases discussed in this section, there were no undisbursed loan
funds when the work was completed. After the contractor finished erecting the
structure, he presented a claim for payment to the lender. The lender subsequently
released loan funds to the owner of the building without inquiring whether the
owner had paid for the labor and materials. There was no contractual obligation
on the part of the lender to pay the contractor directly, and it does not appear that
the pay-out to the owner was a departure from the loan agreement. Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the contractor could recover from the
lender on a negligence theory.
The negligence found in Cook was careless disbursement of funds to a bor-
rower, who diverted the money from the project. There are, of course, other
possible factual settings that might produce similar results. For example, a lender
might pay out on its loan commitment faster than the terms of the loan agreement
provide, without notice to the prime contractor or other suppliers. Acceleration of
payments might be agreed to as a good-faith response to a cash-flow problem of a
developer that is experiencing what it hopes is temporary difficulty. The effect of
that acceleration, however, might be to conceal for a time that the project is failing,
[V€OL 130:416-.
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A. Third Party Beneficiary Claims
Unpaid suppliers of labor and materials frequently base claims
against undisbursed construction loan funds on the theory that
ihey are third party beneficiaries of the agreements between de-
Yelopers and construction lenders. More precisely, they claim that
'they are beneficiaries of the construction lenders' promises to pay
out the full amounts committed. 16 A number of such claims have
been successful in reported decisions. Because the results turn
largely on the terms of particular loan agreements, only limited
general conclusions are possible.
It is well-settled in the law of contracts that the creation of
third-party-beneficiary status occurs only when the two parties nego-
tiating the arrangement intend to confer that status on a third
party.17 In a number of litigated cases,' 8 that critical element of
intent was expressly negated by a clause of the loan agreement. For
example, the agreement in R.M. Shoemaker Co: v. Southeastern
Pennsylvania Economic Development Corp., a recent Pennsyl-
vania case involving the construction of a multi-million dollar in-
dustrial mall, contained this clause: "No Third-Party Beneficiaries.
No part of the Loan will be, at any time, subject or liable to attach-
ment or levy at the suit of any creditor or Borrower, or at the suit
thus inducing suppliers of labor and materials to continue to perform work for
which they will not be paid after the loan funds have been totally drawn.
Although unpaid suppliers apparently have not attempted often to recover on a
theory of common-law negligence, there are statutory provisions in New York and
other states that address the problem of a borrower who diverts funds after receiving
payments from a construction lender. See supra note 8.
16 In Koppers Co. v. Carling & Langlois, 594 F.2d 1094 (6th Cir. 1979)
(applying Michigan law), a contractor brought suit against a disbursing agent
rather than the lender. For reasons not made clear in the opinion of the court,
the contractor conceded that it was not a third party beneficiary of the lender's
promise to pay out the construction loan funds, and instead sought to establish
that it was a third party beneficiary of the owner's covenant in the loan agreement
to use the proceeds of the loan to pay for the costs of construction. Id. 1098.
The Court of Appeals rejected that claim, saying that, even if the contractor could
qualify as a third party beneficiary of the owner's promise, such status would allow
recovery only against the owner, who was not a defendant. Id. The contractor
also claimed to be a third party beneficiary of the agreement by which the lender
engaged the disbursing agent to handle the administration of the construction loan.
The court held that this common type of principal-agent agreement does not create
third-party-beneficiary rights, and that, because the contractor had conceded it had
no claim against the principal, there could be no claim against the agent. Id.
1098-99.
17J. CAw. atu & J. PEaMLo, CovrRAcTs § 17-2 (2d ed. 1977); 4 A. Conm~r,
ComrA.cs §§ 776-77 (1951).
18 These cases are discussed infra at notes 19-20 & 25-26 and' accompanying
text. See also Spires v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 364 Pa. 52, 56-57, 70 A.2d 828,
830-31 (1950); Hillbrook Apts., Inc. v. Nyce Crete Co., 237 Pa. Super. Ct. 565,
571, 352 A.2d 148, 151 (1975).
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of the General Contractor, any subcontractor or materialman, or
any of their creditors." 19 The Pennsylvania Superior Court held
that this clause precluded the general contractor's suit. Clauses of
this type are apparently an insurmountable obstacle to third-party-
beneficiary claims.
20
A quite different judicial response has occurred when the loan
agreement has explicitly stated that the lender must pay the con-
tractor, subcontractors, and materialmen directly. One such clause
was presented in two Pennsylvania cases, Clardy v. Barco Construc-
tion Co.21 and Demharter v. First Federal Savings & Loan Associa-
tion,2 with varying results. The language of the agreement was:
Now THEREFORE, it is mutually agreed between the par-
ties hereto that the Association shall:
6. Pay out of the funds to contractors, subcontractors
or materialmen, as the Association may elect, for work per-
formed, services rendered, and materials furnished in and
about the construction of the building. Such payments
shall be made at such times and in whatever amounts the
Association may deem expedient, and shall be made accord-
ing to requisitions approved by a building inspector desig-
nated by the Association, which requisition shall be in such
form and shall contain such information as the Association
may require; it being the intention of the parties hereto
that the Association shall be free to make the payments
heretofore mentioned in such manner that the Associa-
tion's security shall at all times be protected.2 3
19275 Pa. Super. Ct. 594, 600, 419 A.2d 60, 63 (1980) (emphasis in original).
20 See Pioneer Plumbing Supply Co. v. Southwest Say. & Loan Ass'n, 102 Ariz.
258, 428 P.2d 115 (1967); Gee v. Eberle, 279 Pa. Super. Ct. 101, 420 A.2d 1050
(1980); Knight Constr. Co. v. Barnett Mortgage Trust, 572 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1978); see also Ellman, Viewpoint of Lender's Counsel, in PRAcTisiNG LAw
INsrruTn, CONsinucTnoN LENDnGO 300 (1973).
21205 Pa. Super. Ct. 218, 208 A.2d 793 (1965).
22412 Pa. 142, 194 A.2d 214 (1963).
2s Clardy, 205 Pa. Super. Ct. at 221 n.1, 208 A.2d at 795 n.1 (emphasis in
original). The construction loan agreement also provided:
It is expressly understood and agreed, any provisions in this agree-
ment to the contrary notwithstanding:
(G) That the Association shall assume no liability whatsoever to the
Owner, his contractors, sub-contractors and materialmen, or others, except
for its malfeasance in the application of the said funds for the purposes
hereinbefore recited and shall be fully protected in making any payment
upon the faith of any requisition, inspector's certificate or release of lien
or other instrument, believed by it to be genuine and to have been duly
[Vol 130-416
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The Pennsylvania Superior Court held in Clardy that the gen-
eral contractor was a third party beneficiary of the construction loan
agreement between the lender and the owner. In addition to rely-
ing on paragraph 6, set out above, the court noted that the general
contractor was referred to by name in the loan agreement; indeed,
he was a signatory to it. The court did not offer any explanation
for the three-party execution of the loan agreement.24
In Demharter, an earlier case involving the identical language,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied third-party-beneficiary
status to subcontractors and materialmen. The court declared that
the clause permitted, but did not require, the lender to pay sub-
contractors or materialmen. -  The court said that "[t]he right to
pay is vastly different from the duty to pay; and only the latter can
be enforced." 
26
executed by the proper parties, and the Owner does hereby release and
discharge the Association of and from any such liability and hereby further
agrees to indemnify and save harmless the said Association of and from
any and all liability, damages, costs and expenses which it may sustain by
reason of its application of said funds in good faith for the purposes here-
inbefore set forth.
Id.
24 Counsel for construction lenders have urged inclusion of the prime contractor
as a party to a construction loan agreement in order to obtain from the contractor
certain covenants and consents for the benefit of the lender. See Ellman, supra
note 20, at 251-59, 310-13 (1973).
25 An unusual aspect of Clardy is that the plaintiff was not the prime contractor,
but rather was a subcontractor. Clardy was decided by the Superior Court only
two years after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Derharter, had denied third-
party-beneficiary status to subcontractors under an agreement with the same pay-
ment provision. The subcontractor in Clardy avoided the holding of Demharter by
first reducing its claim against the prime contractor to judgment; thereafter, the
subcontractor, using garnishment in execution of that judgment, asserted the prime
contractor's claim against the lender.
2 6 Demharter, 412 Pa. at 153, 194 A.2d at 219 (emphasis in original).
The result in Clardy followed from the explicit language of the loan agreement
concerning the manner in which the loan funds were to be paid out. In the proper
circumstances, the same kind of claim could perhaps be based on an implied term
of the agreement. If, by usage of trade, lenders ordinarily pay the prime con-
tractors, subcontractors, or materialmen directly, this prevailing practice might be-
come an implied term of the loan agreement unless expressly negated. Cf. Boyd &
Lovesee Lumber Co. v. Western Pac. Fin. Corp., 44 Cal. App. 3d 460, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 699 (1975) (claim that lender, who followed the practice of making direct
payment to subcontractors and materialmen, had been negligent in making payments
to owner and to prime contractor for materials supplied by claimant). One claimant
tried to rely on the American Bankers Association's Mortgage Officer Handbook,
which said that it was "good policy" for a lender to require builders to support
their requests for advances with affidavits that the subcontractors and materialmen
had been paid. The court concluded that the Handbook merely suggested guide-
lines, which might be disregarded if the lender considered them unsuitable for a
particular construction project. First Nat'l State Bank v. Carlyle House, Inc., 102
N.J. Super. 300, 246 A.2d 22 (Ch. Div. 1968), af'd, 107 N.J. Super. 389, 25&
A.2d 545 (App. Div. 1969), cert. denied, 55 N.J. 316, 261 A.2d 359 (1970).
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The concern of the lenders in Clardy and Demharter, explicitly
stated in the terms of the loan agreements, was to protect their
security in the property. By reserving the right to pay the contrac-
tor, subcontractors, or materialmen, the lenders could take whatever
action they thought most expedient to deal with unpaid claimants
who might obtain mechanics' liens in the property. Nonetheless,
the court in Clardy went beyond this expressed purpose and con-
cluded that the loan agreement gave the prime contractor third-
party-beneficiary status.
Other contract devices used by lenders to protect their security
in the property have also been construed to create third party
beneficiaries. One such device is a requirement that the owner-
borrower prove that all costs of labor and materials and other ex-
penses had been fully paid as a condition on the lender's duty to
pay the final installment, which normally includes the retainages.
Two California courts 57 have held that such a term in the loan
agreement conferred third-party-beneficiary status on laborers and
materialmen. But where the owner-developer had merely cov-
enanted with the lender that it would pay all claims of subcon-
tractors and materialmen, courts- have refused-to accord third-pary-
beneficiary status to those parties.28 A fortiori, where the lender
had been authorized to pay out loan funds to the borrower without
concern for the possible diversion of those funds from laborers and
materialmen, no third-party-beneficiary rights were established.2 9
2 7 Ralph C. Sutro Co. v. Paramount Plastering, Inc., 216 Cal. App. 2d 433,
31 Cal. Rptr. 174 (1963); Whiting-Mead Co. v. West Coast Bond & Mortgage Co.,
66 Cal. App. 2d 460, 152 P.2d 629 (1944).
2 8 See Stephens v. Great S. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 421 S.W.2d 332 (Mo. Ct. App.
1967); First Nat'l State Bank v. Carlyle House, Inc., 102 N.J. Super. 300, 246
A.2d 22 (Ch. Div. 1968), af'd, 107 N.J. Super. 389, 258 A.2d 545 (App. Div.
1969), cert. denied, 55 NJ. 316, 261 A.2d 359 (1970).
In International Paper Co. v. Whitson, 571 F.2d 1133 (10th Cir. 1977), a
recent Oklahoma case, the owner of the property being improved had also acted
as prime contractor. In obtaining a construction loan, the owner-contractor had
given the lender an unconditional, irrevocable letter of credit as assurance that it
would perform the contractor's obligations. A federal court of appeals, applying
Oklahoma law, held that the parties to this agreement had intended that subcon-
tractors and materialmen would be paid from this source if the owner-contractor
defaulted.
2 9 Irwin v. Murphy, 81 Ariz. 148, 302 P.2d 534 (1956).
The claimant in Irwin also sought recovery on a theory of tortious misrepre-
sentation. The lender at some point had shown the contractor a copy of the
construction loan agreement. The contractor alleged fraud in the lender's failure
to disclose that the agreement obligated payment to the borrower, upon issuance
of an architect's certificate, without regard to whether the owner had paid those
who supplied labor and materials. The court held that the meaning of the loan
agreement was a question of law, not fact, and that there was no evidence of
actionable fraud. See also Urban Syss. Dev. Corp. v. NCNB Mortgage Corp.,
513 F.2d 1304 (4th Cir. 1975).
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In another group of cases, third-party-beneficiary protection has
been claimed by prime contractors on the basis of their considerable
involvement in arranging for the construction loans. This is par-
ticularly likely to happen in small projects, such as the construction
of a single home or the renovation of an existing residence. An
unsophisticated owner, knowing less about construction financing
than the builder, may be led, by the latter to a lending institution.
Under these circumstances, some builders have sought recognition
as third party beneficiaries of the loan agreements, even though they
were not named in the documents, because the lenders were quite
aware from the outset of the tripartite arrangement. In two such
cases,30 courts have declined to grant relief. In one of them-Winne-
bago Homes, Inc. v. Sheldon 31-the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
explained that, even if a promise for the benefit of the builder
could have been implied from the circumstances, the borrower's
default had excused the lender from the obligation to pay the
builder, who had no better contract position than the borrower.
Even if the contractor has been mentioned specifically in the
loan agreement documents, recovery is not ensured. In L.B. Herbst
Corp. v. Northern Illinois Corp.,32 a 1966 Illinois case, the fixture
supplier for an 82-unit townhouse development had received an
acceptance letter from the owner-developer which adopted by ref-
erence the construction-loan commitment letter issued by the lender
to the owner-developer. The Illinois Appellate Court held that
the supplier was not a third party beneficiary, and that, even if it
were, the evidence did not show that the supplier had satisfactorily
performed in conformity with the fixture supply contract.
In Burns v. Washington Savings,33 a 1965 Mississippi case, loan
commitments for four residences to be constructed by the same
builder had been negotiated by the builder, to whom the commit-
ment letters were subsequently addressed. The lender later re-
fused to make the loans to the prospective homeowners; the reason
for this refusal was not indicated by the court. The builder sued,
alleging that the lender's default had forced him to foreclose on the
30 Apex Siding & Roofing Co. v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 301 P.2d 352
(Okla. 1956); Winnebago Homes, Inc. v. Sheldon, 29 Wis. 2d 692, 139 N.W.2d
606 (1966). Although it denied recovery on a third-party-beneficiary rationale,
the Oklahoma court in Apex Siding held in favor of the claimant on the principle
of equitable estoppeL The contractor in that case had completed the improvements
before the lender disavowed the construction loan commitment.
3129 Wis. 2d at 700,139 N.W.2d at 609.
3299 Ill. App. 2d 101, 241 N.E.2d 125 (1968).
33251 Miss. 789, 171 So. 2d 322 (1965),
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mortgages on the four properties and to sell them at a loss. The
Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the builder's close'in-
volvement in the negotiation of the commitment letters did not
make him a third party beneficiary of the lender's obligations.34
Summing up these cases, it appears that the contract doctrine
of third party beneficiary can be used successfully in some instances
by prime contractors, and by subcontractors and materialmen as well,
in enforcement of lenders' obligations in construction loan agree-
ments. The content of the loan agreement is critical in such claims.
Some terms that were designed to protect lenders against the prob-
lems of unpaid claimants have been construed to give those claim-
ants the right to enforce the loan commitments. But achieving
third-party-beneficiary status does not ensure a favorable judgment
for the supplier of labor and materials. There may be unsatisfied
conditions on the lender's duty that bar recovery despite such
status. 5  Borrower defaults on the loan agreements are likely to
excuse lenders from performance in many such cases in which
unpaid claimants seek reimbursement. As a few of the cases 36 dis-
cussed above indicate, however, there may be circumstances in which
the lender's duty to pay is not excused. In those circumstances, the
third-party-beneficiary doctrine may be utilized to obtain relief.
B. Pre-Contract Guaranty of the
Developer's Obligation
In the negotiations leading to the congeries of contracts for a
construction project, a prospective supplier of labor or materials
might bargain for and receive a guaranty from the lender. Thus,
a potential prime contractor, concerned about the creditworthiness
of the developer, might agree to do the work only if the developer's
obligation to pay the prime contractor was guaranteed by someone
more reliable. Similarly, a subcontractor or materialman could
bargain for such a three-party arrangement. If the lender should
34 Id. at 798, 171 So. 2d at 325.
3 5 Claimants seeking to enforce construction loan agreements as third party
beneficiaries are aided, no doubt, by the practice of drafting these agreements to
avoid the dangers of providing for nonobligatory advances. Unless a lender's obli-
gation is fixed, the lender runs the risk that its mortgage security will be subordi-
nated to mechanics' or other liens that have intervened since the mortgage was
first recorded. See G. OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF MOTGAGES 404-05
(2d ed. 1970). Cf. Uw. SmpucAox OF LAND TRANsmis AcT § 5-209, 14
U.L.A. 209, 307 (1980).
3 6 See supra text accompanying notes 21-24 & 27.
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agree to be a guarantor, it would become secondarily liable for the
developer's obligations.
A guaranty commitment is theoretically more valuable to the
contractor than would be third-party-beneficiary status. Under the
latter, a breach by the developer of its obligations to the lender, or
other failures of conditions in a construction loan agreement, would
excuse the lender from performance pursuant to its loan commit-
ment. If, however, the construction lender had guaranteed pay-
ment on the developer's promise to a contractor, material failures
in the performance of the loan contract would be irrelevant to the
lender's liability as guarantor.
From the reported cases, it would appear that lenders do not
often knowingly assume liability as guarantors; however, Klein-
Dickert Oshkosh, Inc. v. Frontier Mortgage Corp.,'7 a 1980 Wis-
consin case, was decided against a lender on this theory. The lender
insisted that it had not agreed to guarantee the developer's contrac-
tual obligation to a contractor. The contractor, however, repeatedly
had made clear its demand for a guaranty, and had dealt directly
with the lender's representative, who responded with an ambiguous
letter to the contractor. The court, under the circumstances, con-
strued that letter as a guaranty.
C. Obligation Incurred by Lenders in the Course of
Performance: Guaranty, Promissory Estoppel,
and Misrepresentation Claims
As a development progresses, evidence may accumulate indicat-
ing that the developer is in financial trouble. Its obligations may
have gone unpaid too long, mechanics' liens may have been filed
against the project, or unforeseen setbacks may have occurred. As
the prospect of future payment diminishes, those working on the
project or supplying materials may seek additional assurance that
they will be paid in due course. One entity to which they might
turn for assurance is the construction lender, who also may have
a stake in keeping the project from collapsing. From such mid-
performance communications, unsatisfied suppliers may fashion the
elements of claims that the lender promised to pay them, either
through guaranty of the developer's obligation or as an independent
liability. Lacking consideration in the formal sense, these promises
37 93 Wis. 2d 660, 287 N..W.2d 742 (1980).
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could nevertheless be deemed enforceable under the rubric of prom-
issory estoppel. 38
A close examination of the circumstances surrounding the
lender's assurances to the suppliers may reveal that the lender did
not explicitly promise performance, but merely made a statement of
fact upon which the suppliers relied. In subsequent litigation,
unpaid claimants might invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel
to prevent the lender from contesting these facts. This would per-
mit the claimants to recover under an appropriate legal theory, such
as a promise to pay out of a fund described by the lender. Alterna-
tively, a lender's misrepresentation of a material fact might give rise
to a tort claim if it induces detrimental reliance by a contractor or
supplier.
An example of a successful use of equitable estoppel under
such circumstances is presented by H.O. Bragg Roofing, Inc. v.
First Federal Savings & Loan Association,3 9 a 1964 California
decision. The project at issue in that case involved improvement of
three residential lots. The owner-developer eventually abandoned
all work and left the state, but while work was in progress the
roofing contractor had a telephone conversation with a loan de-
partment employee of the construction lender. The lender's agent
assured the roofer that there were sufficient funds in the building
loan accounts to pay for all materials and labor it furnished, and
that the roofer need not worry about nonpayment because the checks
for roofing work would be issued jointly to the developer and the
roofing contractor. The roofing contractor continued his perform-
ance without taking action under California's "stop notice" statute40
to stop further payments from the loan accounts that could jeopard-
ize payment of his claim. When the roofing contractor later sought
payment, funds in the loan accounts were insufficient. The trial
court held that this evidence was sufficient to estop the lender from
denying the existence of the funds, and upheld the claim of the
roofing contractor.41  The court of appeals affirmed. A similar
case - in Washington also was decided in favor of the claimant,
although the relief was to subordinate the construction lender's
lien in the improved property rather than to allow a monetary claim
against the lender.
38 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRAcTs § 90 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965);
1A A. ConaiN, CoNTRACTS § 204 (1963).
89226 Cal. App. 2d 24, 37 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1964).
4 0 See infra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
41226 Cal. App. 2d at 27, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 777.
42 Schweitzer v. Equitable Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 98 Wash. 139, 167 P. 111 (1917).
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First National State Bank v. Carlyle House, Inc.,43 a 1968 New
Jersey case arising out of. the collapse of a project to build a. 106-
unit apartment building, illustrates the application of the principle
of promissory estoppel. The owner-developer in that case hadJbeen
in financial straits for the better part of a year. as the building pro-
ceeded. One subcontractor stopped work with about $65,000 due
on its contract. Upon hearing that the owner had obtained an addi-
tional loan from the construction lender, the subcontractor tele-
phoned the lender. The subcontractor testified that the lender had
confirmed the new loan, requested the subcontractor to return to
the job, and assured him that he would be paid . . Two other sub-
contractors testified to similar assurances. The lender's witnesses
sharply differed from the subcontractor's witnesses in their recollec-
tions of the conversations. A New Jersey court of equity, weighing
the conflicting testimony, found on the facts against the claimants.
The opinion indicates, however, that the court would have granted
relief if the evidence had been more favorable to the claimants.
For an estoppel claim to succeed, the claimant not only must
prove that the promise or assertion was made, but also must show
that he relied to his detriment on the lender's assertion.. If the sup-
plier had already finished his contractual duties, before communi-
cating with the lender,-it may be impossible to establish reliance.
In Lummus Supply. Co. v. Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Asso-
ciation,4 a recent Georgia case, a materials supplier obtained a docu-
ment, signed by the -lender's senior vice president, in which the
lender agreed to hold in escrow more than $20,000 to pay the sup-
plier. This was much stronger evidence than the typical disputed
testimony about a telephone conversation with an employee of a
lender who may or may not have had authority to bind the lender.
Unfortunately for the claimant, the materials had already been
supplied when this document was prepared. Moreover, the ma-
terialman had acted promptly to perfect a mechanic's lien, thus
negating a possible theory of reliance by failure to resort to other
available remedies, as' in Bragg. The Georgia court held that the
lender's promise7 was unenforceable for lack of consideration.
43 102 N.J. Super. 300, 246 A.2d 22 (Ch. Div. 1968), aff'd, 107 NJ. Super.
389, 258 A.2d 545 (App. Div. 1969), cert. denied, 55 N.J. 316, 261 A.2d 359
(1970); accord Mortgage Assocs., Inc. v. Monona Shores, Inc., 47 Wis. 2d 171,
182, 177 N.W.2d 340, 348 (1970) ("The difficulty with this argument on appeal
is that the trial court found no such promises were made by Associates . . .
see also Urban Syss. Dev. Corp. v. NCNB Mortgage Corp., 513 F.2d 1304 (4th
Cir. 1975).
44 141 Ga. App. 831, 234 SE.2d 671 .(1977).
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In promissory estoppel cases, as in any suit to enforce a con-
tract, -the defendant will succeed if there is a material unsatisfied
condition on the disputed promise. In a 1966 Wisconsin case,48
for example, part of the court's analysis in rejecting a promissory
estoppel claim followed from its conclusion that -there was an un-
filled condition on the lender's promise that induced the builder to
continue performance.
The elements of a claim based on estoppel, whether equitable
or promissory, are closely related to the elements of the tort of mis-
representation. For example, if a lender informs a subcontractor
that there is $46,000 in the construction loan account, when the
account contains only $26,000, and the subcontractor proceeds in
reliance on the lender's statement, the lender might be held liable
for tortious misrepresentation. 6 Other critical misstatements may
occur during performance. As a Florida appellate court has stated:
"A. construction lender who falsely advises a materialman or sub-
contractor that the mortgage is not in default must suffer the con-
sequences if further-work and materials are incorporated into the
project in reliance thereon."47 In neither that case nor a later
case, however, were the claimants able to satisfy the courts that the
requisite facts had been proved.
48
Estoppel and misrepresentation theories offer relief to unpaid
claimants only on the particular facts of each case. Where a lender
has made a statement or a promise, and the contractor has changed
position in reliance on the statement or promise, a substantial pos-
sibility for relief exists.
II. STATUTORY PROVISIONS
A. Stop Notice Statutes
Several states have adopted statutes that allow subcontractors
and materialmen to halt further payments of construction loan
funds from the construction lender to a developer. By preventing
further disbursements, these claimants preserve funds from which
they can seek eventual payment. The protection of these "stop
45 Winnebago Homes, ine. v. Sheldon, 29 Wis. 2d 692, 139 N.W.2d 606 (1966);
see supra text accompanying note 31.
4" See Klein-Dickert Oshkosh, Inc. v. Frontier Mortgage Corp., 93 Wis. 2d 660,
287 N.W.2d 742 (1980) (dictum).
47J.G. Plumbing Serv., Inc. v. Coastal Mortgage Co., 329 So. 2d 393, 396 (Fla.
Dist Ct. App.), cert. denied, 339 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 1976).
4sSee Indiana Mortgage & Realty Investors v. Peacock Constr. Co., 348 So. 2d
59 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1977), cert. denied, 353 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 1979).
[Vol.130:416
CONSTRUCTION LENDERS' .LIABIUTY -
notice" statutes is in addition to the property interests that can be
obtained by mechanics' liens. The beneficiaries, of these statutes do
not include general contractors. Subcontractors and materialmen,
however, are given a power to control performance of construction
loan agreements without regard to privity of contract.
By both statute49 and judicial decision,50 unpaid -suppliers of
labor and materials receive special protection in California. In
addition to its version- of mechanics' lien interest in improved prop-
erty,51 California has had a "stop notice" statute since 1951.52 To
invoke the act against a construction lender, a subcontractor or
materialman sends a notice of his claim to the lender, together with
a bond of one'and one-fourth times the claim. 3  The purpose of
the bond is to protect the lender if the claim is not ultimately
established as valid. Unless a recorded payment bond 'exists for the
protection of unpaid suppliers of labor or materials, a construction
lender, upon receipt of a bonded stop notice, "shall ... withhold
from the borrower or other person to whom it or the owner may
be obligated to make payments or advancement out of the con-
struction fund, sufficient money to answer such claim." 1'
The California courts have consistently upheld claimants who
have met the requirements of the act.55 The California "stop
4 9 
CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 3156-3175, 3264 (West 1974).
4o See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
51 CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 3109-3154 (West 1974 & Supp. 1981).,
52 Id. §§ 3156-3175.
53 Id §§ 3083, 3159. A lender is permitted to ignore a stop notice sent without
a bond. See id. § 3162.
5d1 § 3162.
The California "stop notice" statute is not limited to proceedings against lenders.
Unpaid suppliers of labor and materials can also issue "stop notices" to owners.
When a "stop notice" is issued to an owner, the claimant need not provide a bond
in order to make the notice binding. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 3161 (West 1974). , -
California is not alone in having a "stop notice" statute. Professor Sweet notes
that seven other states have similar legislation: Alabama, Indiana, Mississippi; New
Jersey, North Carolina, Texas, and Washington. J. SWEET, supra note 8, at 471 ,
see ALA. CODE § 35-11-227(b) (1975); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-8-3-9 (Bums 1979);
Miss. CODE ANN. .§ 85-7-181 (1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:44-77 to -78 (West
1952); N.C. GEN. STAT. §44A-20 (1976); TF_X. REv. Cxv. STAT. ANN. art 5463
(Vernon Supp. 1982); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 60.04.110, .210 (Supp. 1981).
Each of these statutes has its own unique provisions. The New Jersey, North Caro-
lina, and Washington statutes apply to both owners and lenders; the remainder apply
only to owners. For a discussion of the Washington statute, see Comment,
Mechanics" Liens: The "Stop Notice" Comes to Washington, 49 W-. L. REv. 685
(1974).
55 Hunt, The Stop Notice Revisited, 54 CAL. S.B.J. 24 (1979).
1981] -
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notice" statute has also been upheld against a contention that it
fails to afford procedural due process.56
B. Subordination of Lender's Mortgage
Under the New York Lien Law, a construction lender is en-
titled to lien priority over mechanics' liens only if the loan agree-
ment is publicly recorded.57 The recorded agreement must disclose
"'the net sum available to the borrower for the improvement." 18 A
lender who fails to comply with the public notice requirement will
have its mortgage subordinated to any mechanics' liens.59 As with
"stop notice" statutes, the only beneficiaries of this act are subcon-
tractors and materialmen. Because the operative effect of the stat-
ute is limited to defining priorities among competing liens in the
same property, the act does not directly affect the construction loan
agreement. Indirectly, however, the public recording of these
agreements allows any interested contractor, subcontractor, or ma-
terials supplier to ascertain the level of financing and to act
accordingly.
The New York courts have applied the statute liberally. In
HNC Realty Co. v. Bay View Towers Apartments, Inc.,60 the re-
corded loan agreement specified that the borrower would provide
surety payment bonds for subcontractors and materialmen. The
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court held that the
lender's acquiescence in the contractor's obtaining only a perform-
ance bond was a modification of the loan agreement. Because the
loan agreement as modified was unrecorded, the lender lost its
priority.
Similarly, the publicly recorded loan agreement at issue in
Security National Bank v. Village Mall, Inc.,61 called for a final
installment of the construction loan of not less than ten percent of
the loan. The court held that the lender lost priority by agreeing,
in an unrecorded modification, to reduce the retainage to five per-
cent. The lender in that case lost even though the recorded loan
agreement permitted the lender to advance part or all of any in-
56 See Connolly Dev., Inc. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 803, 553 P.2d 637, 132
Cal. Rptr. 477 (1976); appeal dismissed mem., 429 U.S. 1056 (1977).
457N.y. LXEN LAw §§ 13, 22 (McKinney 1966).
58 Id. § 22.
59 Nanuet Nat'l Bank v. Eckerson Terrace, Inc., 47 N.Y.2d 243, 391 N.E.2d
983, 417 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1979); see N.Y. LI-N LAw § 13(1) (McKinney 1966).
6064 A.D.2d 417, 409 N.Y.S.2d 774 (App. Div. 1978).
61 85 Misc. 2d 771, 382 N.Y.S.2d 882 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
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stallment before it became due, if the lender believed it advisable
to do so, and stipulated that any such advance would not constitute
a modification of the agreement. 2 This clause,, commonly used in
construction loan agreements in New York, did not override the
apparent assurance of a large payment in the final installment. A
clause permitting the lender to anticipate payments did protect a
lender in another case, however, even though it had paid out ninety
percent of the proceeds of a construction loan at a time when only
fifty percent of the project had been completed.63
Several other states have enacted similar statutory provisions
designed, like the New York Lien Law, to protect subcontractors
and materialmen.
6 4
III. NONSTATUTORY LiABimrrY rNTHE ABSENCE
OF PRivITY
Cases in which contractors or suppliers are able to show con-
tractual privity with construction lenders involve unusual factual
circumstances not normally found in construction transactions. In
the more typical transaction, the various parties may be aware of
each other's role, but they do not deal with each other. Lenders
contract with developers, who in turn contract with prime contrac-
tors, and so on down through the tiers of subcontracts and supply
contracts. Despite the absence of privity, a number of courts have
concluded that some unpaid contractors or suppliers should be
granted relief. The theories employed have been the constructive
trust and the equitable lien. In most of these cases, courts have
purported to be granting equitable liens.
The equitable lien is a particular form of the constructive
trust.65 Neither the lien nor the trust depends upon an express or
62 Id. at 786, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 894.
63 Ulster Say. Bank v. Total Communities, Inc., 83 Misc. 2d 645, 372 N.Y.S.2d
793 (Sup. Ct. 1975), aff'd on other grounds, 55 A.D.2d 278, 390 N.Y.S.2d 252
(App. Div. 1976), motion to appeal dismissed, 42 N.Y.2d 805, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1026
(1977); accord Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Four Star Heights, Inc., 70 Misc.
2d 118, 333 N.Y.S.2d 334 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
6 4 Professor Sweet reports that various forms of 'protectivd statutes exist in
Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, Oklahoma, and Texas. See J. Sw=r, supra note
8, at 472-73.
65 See RESTATENmT Or RESTIrT-oN § 160, 194 (1937). For cases that have
imposed constructive trusts, see, e.g., Ralph C. Sutro Co. v. Paramount Plastering,
Inc., 216 Cal. App. 2d 433, 436, 31 Cal. Rptr. 174, 176 (1963); Whiting-Mead Co.
v. West Coast Bond & Mortgage Co., 66 Cal. -App. 2d 460, 464, 152 P.2d 629, 631
(1944); Buchanan v. Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n, 457 Pa. 135, 151, 320 A.2d 117,
126 (1974).
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an implied-in-fact contract. Moreover, neither is based on the idea
of a contract implied-in-law, a traditional basis for certain restitu-
tion remedies; rather, both are based upon property concepts. The
equitable lien is a kind of nonconsensual security interest in spe-
cific property. The constructive trust contemplates that the "trus-
tee" is under a duty, and therefore the equity courts will order him,
io convey property to the "beneficiary." Whether or not a claimant
can establish the requisite property interest does not necessarily
depend upon any contractual analysis. Because property interests
can be created without contractual premises, equitable remedies
vindicating propertr interests can operate free of the restrictions of
privity that pertain to contractual claims.
The rationale underlying these equitable concepts is consistent
with the property character of the remedy. The prototypical equi-
table lien case is said to arise when a person has made improvements
on land that he does not own, and deserves restitution because the
owner of the land otherwise will be unjustly enriched. This fact
pattern usually occurs when the one making the improvements rea-
sonably believes that he owns or is about to become the owner of
the land. To prevent the unjust enrichment, the person who made
the improvements is given a lien on the land, with the consequence
that the owner cannot convey a clear title until he satisfies that
lien.
A constructive trust arises when a per'son holding title to prop-
erty is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another, on the
ground that the constructive trustee would be unjustly enriched if
he were allowed to retain the property.66 in the circumstance of
restitution for improvements upon property, the concepts of con-
structive trust and equitable lien overlap, and the equitable lien is
the means by which a constructive trust is made effective. 67
In the particular context of failed construction projects, with
construction lenders disputing with contractors or suppliers, appli-
cation of these equitable remedies poses serious difficulties. Each
of the parties to the dispute has contractual interests, though not
with all of the others. Each participated in the project with the
primary expectation that its contractual rights would be satisfied.
The inability of contractors -or suppliers to obtain. contractually.
promised payments from those in privity is the cause of their seek--
ing- compensation from a remote party, the construction lender.
Lenders, like the other parties, are committed contractually to im-
6 6 
-STATEMENT oF RESTITUTION § 160 (1937). " ""
67 ld. § 170.
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mediate parties, commonly developers, and the lenders' contract
obligations are defined by the terms of those agreements. To tran-
scend the rights and duties arising by contract, a claimant must
show that the defendant has been enriched, the amount of the
enrichment, that the enrichment is unjust, and a particular property
or res that a court of equity can order to be conveyed or subjected
to an equitable lien. We will return to these analytic problems
after examining some of the cases in which a remedy has been found
proper.
Cases involving completed projects are considered first because
some courts have indicated that these are the clearest instances of
unjust enrichment of construction lenders. When construction
projects have not been completed, courts are in greater conflict over
whether unjust enrichment can be shown.
A. Completed Projects
In Anglo-American Savings & Loan Association v. Campbell, s
an early District of Columbia case involving a five-house develop-
ment, the developer, who was also the prime contractor, had failed
to complete the project. A performance bond surety finished the
buildings, but subcontractors and materialmen were left unpaid as
a result of the developer-prime contractor's default. Notwithstand-
ing that the project had been completed, the construction lender,
with the consent of the developer, withheld $3,000 from the final
installment of the construction loan commitment. According to
the court, this amount was held back "without justification shown
in the conditions of the contract." 69 When the construction lender
and the holders of other encumbrances foreclosed on their security
interests, the mechanics' liens of the subcontractors and materialmen
were rendered worthless. The claimants sued the lender and asked
the court to declare a constructive trust on the undisbursed portion
of the construction loan. The court held for the claimants.
The court found no contractual theory that would support
recovery, but concluded that there were special circumstances justi-
fying equitable relief. The buildings had been completed in
accordance with the plans and specifications submitted to the lender
when the loan commitment was made. The subcontractors and
materialmen knew that there was a construction loan" commitment
and relied upon it. The lender, on the other hand, was charged
with knowledge from the ordinary course of such transactions that
68 13 App. D.C. 581 (D.C. Cir. 1898).
69 Id. 602.
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the loan commitmefit would be a material inducement to subcon-
tractors and materialmen to supply the prime contractor with labor
and materials. The court reasoned thusly:
Having, by its conduct, induced or contributed to in-
duce the appellees to contract with [the prime contractor],
and with their materials to increase the secuiity for its own
debt, it would be inequitable and unjust to permit the asso-
ciation to withhold the money upon which they relied for
reimbursement.
Upon these equitable considerations, we conclude that
the court did not err in decreeing the enforcement of a
constructive trust in favor of the appellees upon the fund
withheld from the loan to [the developer]. 70
An unusual aspect of the Anglo-American Savings case is the
court's conclusion that the lender had no right, under its contract
with the borrower, to withhold the final installment. Because the
performance bond surety had had to complete the project, it is diffi-
cult to conclude that all conditions on the lender's commitment had
been satisfied. The only condition mentioned in the opinion-com-
pletion of the buildings according to the plans and specifications-
may have been satisfied by the surety's performance, but financial
defaults by the developer-prime contractor are almost certain to
have occurred prior to the due date of the final. payment. None-
theless, by concluding that the lender had acted wrongfully under
its commitment contract, the court established the predicate for find-
ing that the lender had been unjustly enriched. The court treated
the lender's debt as a fund that it could order to be paid to the
claimants by means of a constructive trust.
If unpaid contractors or suppliers could obtain equitable relief
only when lenders withheld funds in breach of their loan commit-
ments, few such cases would ever arise.71 As we shall see, courts
70 Id. 603-04.
71 For a rare case illustrating the kind of circumstances in which this fact pat-
tern can occur, see Smith v. Anglo-California Trust Co., 205 Cal. 496, 271 P. 898
(1928). In Smith, there had been undisbursed construction loan funds when the
project (development of five lots) had been completed. Within a few days after
completion, the developer had died. The lender made no claim to the undisbursed
funds. There was no indication of borrower def ult. On appeal, the contestants
were the administratrix of the developer's estate and the unpaid suppliers of labor
and materials. The court held that the suppliers had an "equity" in the undisbursed.
loan funds. The court stressed that Smith had not invested his own funds in. the
project; the land had been acquired with borrowed money and the buildings had
been financed by the construction loan. Since these arrangements were publicly re-
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have not required lender breach of the loan agreement as a necessary
element of a claimant's case for equitable relief.
In Pacific Ready Cut Homes, Inc. v. Title Insurance & Trust
Co.,72 an early California case, the developers-owners completed
building an apartment house, but were otherwise in default under
the construction loan agreement. The default perhaps consisted of
failure to have mechanics' liens on the building removed; but, what-
ever the reason, the court found that the lender, "as permitted by
its loan contract with the owners," 73 had held back a portion of the
construction loan and used it to reduce the amount of principal
and interest owing. When the owners failed to meet their repay-
ment obligation, the lender moved to foreclose on its mortgage. A
materialman, who had sold supplies to the owners, sued to enjoin
foreclosure and to impress an equitable lien on the undisbursed
construction loan funds. The Supreme Court of California held
for the claimant.
The California Supreme Court's decision was influenced to a
considerable extent by its finding that the materialman had relied
not on the creditworthiness of the owners, but on the existence of
a construction loan commitment. Although there were some com-
munications directly between the lender and the materialman, the
court did not base its decision on the possibility of a contractual
commitment arising from those communications. It concluded,
rather, that equitable considerations warranted the result:
The defendant mortgage company, having received the
benefit of plaintiff's performance in the form of a com-
pleted building and therefore a more valuable security for
its note, is not justified in withholding or appropriating to
any other use money originally intended to be used to pay
for such performance, and relied upon by plaintiff in
rendering its performance. 4
The most recent litigation involving completed projects arose
in Florida. In each of three cases, a Florida District Court of Ap-
peal upheld the claim of an unpaid prime contractor to impress an
corded, the court assumed that the suppliers of labor and materials would not have
extended credit to Smith without confidence in the payment of the full amount of
the construction loan. The court concluded that it would work a grievous wrong
to turn over the money to Smith's estate, where it might become charged with the
claims of the estate's creditors.
72 216 Cal. 447,14 P.2d 510 (1932).
73 Id. at 448, 14 P.2d at 510.
74 Id. at 452,14 F.2d at 512.
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equitable lien on the undisbursed portion of a construction loan
commitment. Each case involved a large scale project in which the
developer's: financial planning did not succeed. Upon failure of
the developer, the lender in each case had moved to foreclose on
the construction loan mortgage and the prime contractor had as-
serted a counterclaim, seeking to establish its right to an equitable
lien.
The first case, Fred S. Conrad Construction Co. v. Continental
Assurance Co.,75 arose from a Federal-Housing-Authority-insured
housing development undertaken by the Baptist Senior Citizen
Foundation, Inc. Prior to completion of the project, the Founda-
tion defaulted in payments due to the construction lender. The
lender, however, did not notify either the prime contractor, which
continued to work, or the performance bond surety, which eventu-
ally finished the project. Upon completion, the lender instituted
foreclosure proceedings. The District Court of Appeal held that
the prime contractor and the surety had valid claims against the
remaining balance of undisbursed loan funds upon which they had
had a right to rely for construction work done or to be done.
In two more recent cases, the courts based their decisions more
explicitly on an unjust enrichment theory alone; neither court re-
ferred to contractor reliance in its opinion. Morgen-Oswood &
Associates, Inc. v. Continental Mortgage Investors76 involved a
hotel construction. The owner failed to arrange for permanent
financing as required by the construction loan agreement, and the
construction lender, declaring the mortgage to be in default, refused
to pay the final $93,000 due on the loan commitment. The prime
contractor had completed the hotel, but its mechanic's lien was
subordinate to the construction loan mortgage. The District Court
of Appeal, in holding that the general contractor had an equitable
lien in the undisbursed loan funds, concluded that "[i]f there ever
was a case for imposition of an equitable lien on a particular prop-
erty, it is this one.... [The lender] has been unjustly enriched to
the extent of approximately $93,000, the balance due appellant
under the construction contract." 77
The most recent Florida case, Blosam Contractors, Inc. v.
Republic Mortgage Investors,78 involved a 104-unit condominium.
75 215 So. 2d 45 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1968).
76 323 So. 2d 694 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1975).
77 Id, 684-85.
78 353 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
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The construction loan agreement contemplated marketing of some
units before the final pay-out, which was expressly conditioned on
the developer's selling at least 56 units. The prime contractor was
fully aware of the terms of the loan agreement. The developer
defaulted before any of the units had been sold, but after the entire
project had been built. The District Court of Appeal declared that
the prime contractor was entitled to an equitable lien in the un-
disbursed loan funds:
The 104 completed condominum units are now owned
outright by [the lender, as a result of foreclosure of the
construction loan mortgage]. [Lender] has received the
benefit of its security, as was its right. However, [lender]
still holds $250,000 that should have gone toward the crea-
tion of that security, while [the contractor] has not received
its just dues. This is neither right nor just and the most
feasible method of remedying the injustice is to impose an
equitable lien on the undisbursed proceeds held by [the
lender].79
Neither court explicitly noted contractor reliance in upholding
the claimant's right to recover. On these factual circumstances,
however, there would have been some expectation about construc-
tion loan proceeds. In the setting of Morgen-Oswood, a reasonable
general contractor building a hotel would not proceed without giv-
ing thought to the financing arrangements made by the developer.
But whether or not the contractor made any actual inquiry as to
the terms of the loan commitment is uncertain. The Blosam Con-
tractors opinion explicitly indicates that the prime contractor in
that case had been informed of the precise terms of the loan agree-
ment and had assented to them in an amendment to its contract
with the developer. The contractor thus knew of the condition
upon the lender's obligation to make its final payment, namely,
sale of a certain number of units. Because the condition was un-
satisfied and the court nonetheless held for the contractor, it might
be said that the court was holding implicitly that reliance on the
known terms of the construction loan agreement is not a necessary
part of a claimant's case. The court also noted, however, that the
developer's failure may have been caused by the lender's foreclosure,
and emphasized that the lender's own acts had made satisfaction of
the condition on the final pay-out impossible.
79 Id. 1228.
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B. Partially Completed Projects
The courts that have decided such cases are in conflict about
the availability of equitable liens where contemplated projects have
not been completed.80 The few cases decided to this point have
involved both prime contractor and subcontractor plaintiffs, but
the latter category understandably predominates. In this group of
cases, by definition, the prime contractor had not finished its prom-
ised performance. The only parties who could have performed
fully are subcontractors, materialmen, and those on lower tiers of
the contractual pyramid. If a prime contractor were to seek recovery
on a partially finished project, it would have to justify its abandon-
ment of the work, and presumably would seek to do so on the
ground of developer default, such as failure to make progress pay-
ments due or other material breach of contract.
The Florida courts, which have been quite willing to use an
equitable lien theory in completed projects, have insisted on limit-
ing recovery to those situations.8' These courts have rejected claims
that lenders had been unjustly enriched by foreclosure on partially
finished building projects. In 1.G. Plumbing Service, Inc. v. Coastal
Mortgage Co.,8 a case arising out of an unfinished condominium
development, for example, a Florida District Court of Appeal re-
fused to give an unpaid plumbing subcontractor an equitable lien
in undisbursed construction loan funds:
We do not believe that this principle can be extended
to a situation where the default occurs before the construc-
tion contemplated by the loan agreement has been com-
pleted. Under these circumstances, the construction lender
is left with the remedy of foreclosing upon a partially
completed building. More often than not, the market
value of a partially constructed building will be substan-
tially less than the total cost of the labor and material
which has already been incorporated into its construction.
Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the mort-
gagee has been unjustly enriched. To adopt the rule urged
by appellant would place upon construction lenders the
unwarranted duty of affirmatively keeping all of the sub-
contractors and materialmen advised of the status of the
mortgage and might even discourage a mortgage lender
So See generally G. OsBoRN, supra note 4, at 754.
81 Id. 754 n.23.
82329 So. 2d393 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
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from working with its mortgagor so as to enable him to cor-
rect his default and to complete the job.83
A different point of view prevailed, for a brief time at least, in
California. In the mid-1960's, three cases in California's First Dis-
trict Court of Appeal involved claimants who had not met the
requirements of that state's statutory protection for unpaid sub-
contractors and materialmen. They were decided, therefore, on a
theory of equitable lien. These three cases indicated a tendency
among California courts to impose lender liability in the absence of
contractual privity with suppliers of labor and materials.
Miller v. Mountain View Savings & Loan Association 84 in-
volved the construction of five small apartment buildings. The
court found that the loan agreement had set up an escrow agent to
represent suppliers of labor and materials, and held that this ar-
rangement had induced a plumbing contractor to perform in reli-
ance on the construction loan fund. Rejecting any requirement of
completion of the whole project, the court said:
In Pacific Ready Cut Homes the lender was expressly
denied the right to offset the balance held against the prin-
cipal of the loan to the detriment of the lien claimant. It
is no great step to conclude that such offset should not be
allowed even though the building is not complete ....
The reasoning behind... Pacific Ready Cut Homes is as
applicable to the claimant putting in the foundation, or
the rough plumbing, as it is to the carpenter driving the
last spike. All other factors being equal the rights of one
contributing to the construction should not depend on the
stage thereof at which his contribution was made.85
In Miller, the element of unjust enrichment was thought to be
manifested by the prompt resale, after foreclosure, of the partially
finished development, seemingly at a considerable profit to the
lender. When the property was sold by the trustee under the deed
of trust, the lender "paid" some $65,000, approximately the amount
advanced to the borrower. Immediately thereafter, the lender re-
s3Id. 395; accord Giffen Indus., Inc. v. Southeastern Assocs., Inc., 357 So. 2d
217 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Snead Constr. Corp. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 342 So. 2d 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (prime contractor as plaintiff).
84238 Cal. App. 2d 644, 48 Cal. Rptr. 278 (1965).
85 Id. at 664, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 292 (discussing Pacific Ready Cut Homes, Inc. v.
Title Ins. & Trust Co., 216 Cal. 447, 14 P.2d 510 (1932), discussed supra in text
at note 72). The court also referred to Smith v. Anglo-California Trust Co., 205
Cal. 496, 271 P. 898 (1928), discussed supra in note 71.
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sold the property for over $76,000, realizing what the court called
a "profit" of about $11,000. Thus, the'court in Miller had rather
persuasive evidence, in the resale price, that the value of the par-
tially completed development was greater than the debt owed to
the lender which had bought the property in foreclosure proceed-
ings for the latter amount.
McBain v. Santa Clara Savings & Loan Association,s8 the sec-
ond case in California's First District, elaborated on the decision
in Miller. The project involved was a residence, and the developer
also had served as prime contractor. Claimants were various sub-
contractors and materialmen who had been left unpaid when the
developer abandoned the partially completed project. Unlike
Miller, the loan funds had not been transferred to an escrow agent.
Moreover, the various claimants had had only vague information
about the developer's agreement with the lender, and all of that
information had come from the developer. The Court of Appeal
held that this was a sufficient factual base to establish that the
claimants had relied on payment from the loan commitment:
[A]n equitable lien may be imposed on the fund if either
the borrower or the lender induced persons in the position
of appellants [to rely on the loan fund for payment]....
[W]here suppliers of labor or materials have been
induced to rely on the loan fund by either the borrower
or the lender, their equitable liens on the fund should
have priority over the claims of both of such last mentioned
persons to the fund.s7
The Court of Appeal concluded that, if the lender had had any
deficiency claim against the developer following sale on foreclosure
of the mortgage, that deficiency would be subordinated to the
equitable claimants.
Doud Lumber Co. v. Guaranty Savings & Loan Association,)"
the third First District case, arose from the claim of a supplier of
materials to a prime contractor building an apartment house. Prior
to the beginning of the project, the prime contractor had been in
arrears in payments to the materialman for previous purchases. At
the outset, therefore, the materialman ascertained from the prime
contractor that the developer had obtained a construction loan com-
86 241 Cal. App. 2d 829, 51 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1966).
871d. at 841, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 86 (emphasis in original).
88 254 Cal. App. 2d 585, 60 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1967).
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mitment, and was given the name of the lender. Satisfied with this
information from this source, the supplier made deliveries for the
project. Later, when payments were not forthcoming, the supplier
contacted the lender directly for the first time. The lender replied
that funds were flowing slowly because of the payment schedule in
the loan agreement, and that nothing more could be done. There-
after, when the developer defaulted on its obligation to make its
first payment to the lender, the lender moved to foreclose on its
mortgage. The developer owed the lender about $74,500 when
foreclosure occurred. After foreclosing, the lender resold the prop-
erty for $81,000. On these facts, the materialman sought an equi-
table lien in the undisbursed portion of the construction loan
commitment.89
The trial court held that the claimant had neither relied upon
nor been materially induced by the loan agreement between the
lender and the developer, and that the lender had not been uncon-
scionably enriched by foreclosing.90 On appeal, the District Court
of Appeal reversed, holding as a matter of law that the mere exist-
ence of a loan agreement and an arrangement for progress payments
therefrom constituted a material inducement to a supplier to make
deliveries to the project on credit.91 The court also determined
that the lender had been considerably enriched at the expense of
the materials supplier, whose goods had increased the value of the
structure and made the "profit" possible.92
One possible justification for the courts' actions in these cases
is that they allowed claimants to recover for the value that they had
contributed to the property, thereby enhancing the security of the
construction lenders. This rationale was acknowledged in Miller,93
but the court also recognized that, as a practical matter, a partially
completed project may not have increased enough in value to cover
the cost of the supplies and labor incorporated into it.94 This was
89 Id. at 586-88, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 95-96.
90 Id. at 588, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 96.
91 Id. at 591, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 97-98.
92 Id. at 592, 60 CaL Rptr. at 98.
93 See 238 Cal. App. 2d at 659,48 Cal. Rptr. at 288.
94 Id. at 659 & n.7, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 288 & n.7. In this footnote, the court in-
cluded a number of calculations seemingly intended to show that the value of a
partially finished building may be different from the value of the labor and supplies
contributed to the work up to that point. The first calculation contrasted the trial
court's finding of the value of the plumbing work in place with the differential be-
tween the subcontract price and the actual costs of completion. Subcontract price
less cost of completion might be indicative of the value of the unfinished work in
some circumstances, but it was undercut here by evidence that inflation and vandalism
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the argument that had persuaded the Florida courts to confine
relief to completed projects, but it did not deter the California
courts. Once the point was noted in Miller, the opinion never
mentioned it again.
Both the Miller and Doud Lumber Co. decisions seem to have
been influenced by the conclusion that the lenders, who had resold
the partially completed buildings after foreclosure, had made a
"profit," in the sense that their receipts on resale exceeded the
amounts they paid to buy the properties on foreclosure. This ele-
ment was lacking in McBain, in which, apparently, no resale had oc-
curred.95 The opinion in Doud Lumber Co. states that the "profit"
had been made at the expense of the unpaid material supplier,,,
but this seems to ignore the possibility that the "profit" may have
been the result of imperfections in the public sale mechanism of
foreclosure, which would have taken place even if the materialman
had been paid in full. If so, the "profit" would not have been the
result of the nonpayment of the materialman.
In Miller, the court offered a rationale that went beyond
allowing suppliers of labor and materials to recover for having in-
creased a building's value. The court considered the power of
lenders to reduce the risk to other parties of going unpaid for their
labor or materials:
[T]here are strong reasons of policy to require the commer-
cial lenders to police the speculative building industry by
penalizing the lender if the project fails. . . . It leaves
open to the lender [possible] protection through the re-
quirement of a completion bond .... It is also suggested
that the lender, in addition to inspecting physical progress
after the work had stopped had driven up the actual costs of completion when work
had resumed.
The second calculation used by the court included all work done, not only the
labor and materials provided by the subcontractor claimant. This calculation began
with the resale price obtained by the lender after foreclosing, from which the
court deducted the price paid by the developer for the land. The difference, pre-
sumably, was indicative of the value of the partially completed building. The
figure was then contrasted with the total of (1) the amount advanced by the con-
struction lender, (2) the amount of the unpaid claims, and (3) the (unstated)
amount of the owner's investment. The total of these three was larger than the
figure derived for the building value. This calculation, like the first, is unsatis-
factory, because it assumes that one subcontractor's work is no more or less valuable
than that of other suppliers of labor and materials. More fundamentally, this cal-
culation assumes that the value of work equals the amounts paid for it and that
none of the lender's advances and the owner's investment was diverted from the
project.
95 See 241 Cal. App. 2d at 833, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
96 254 Cal. App. 2d at 592, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 98.
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of the work, call for receipted bills, or issue joint checks
* and use other fiscal controls to insure that payments are -
properly applied.
97
-The court appears to have envisioned the risk of diversion of funds
by developers, and possibly by prime contractors as well, as the
.dspeculative" aspect of the building industry. The kinds of polic-
ing suggested would prevent or inhibit diversion of funds intended
.by a lender eventually to reach subcontractors and materialmen, but
,diversion of construction loan proceeds is only one possible cause
,of failure of subcontractors and materialmen to be paid.
The California courts did not develop a satisfactory rationale
for their view in these cases. Whether a more fully articulated
position would have emerged in later cases cannot be known, be-
cause the California legislature snuffed out the possibility by passing
a statute 9 8 prohibiting any further use of the theory of equitable
lien to compensate parties in building projects.99
The most important equitable lien case involving a partially
completed project is Gee v. Eberle100 a 1980 decision by the Penn-
sylvania Superior Court. In that case, the developers lost a major
prospective tenant during construction of a shopping center. The
commitment of the construction lender apparently had been made
conditional upon the status of rental contracts; withdrawal of this
tenant led the lender to reduce its commitment from $1,350,000 to
$1,100,000. This change, perhaps coupled with other financial
problems, led to the developer's defaulting on interest payments
due to the lender. Notwithstanding the defaults, the lender con-
tinued to make advances on the construction loan commitment for
several months, and work continued. After the lender had paid
out slightly over $1,000,000, work stopped with the shopping center
still unfinished. Thereafter, the lender paid in excess of $200,000
to substantially complete the project. The lender later foreclosed
on the mortgage securing the construction loan and bought the
property for $500,000.
07238 Cal. App. 2d at 658-59, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 288.
98 CAL. Cirv. CODE § 3264 (West 1974).
99 For an analysis of this legislation, which was passed in 1967, see Cutierrez,
California Civil Code Section 3264 and the Ghost of the Equitable Lien, 30 HAsT-
NcGs LJ. 493, 514-21 (1979). A recent determined effort to find some weakness in
the preclusiveness of section 3264 totally failed. See Pankow Constr. Co. v. Advance
Mortgage Corp., 618 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1980).
100 279 Pa. Super. Ct. 101, 420 A.2d 1050 (1980).
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Unpaid subcontractors filed suit in equity against the construc-
tion lender. The claimants contended that they were entitled to>
payment out of the difference between the original loan commit-
ment--$1,350,000-and the amount actually advanced by the
lender-slightly over $1,000,000. Claimants maintained that the
lender should be declared a constructive trustee of the unexpended
loan funds, or alternatively that they should be held to have an
equitable lien upon the funds. From denial of relief in the trial
court, the subcontractors appealed.1 "
The Superior Court held for the subcontractor appellants. In
the posture of the case, this required remand for trial, and the ap-
pellate court's opinion thus sought only to lay down the legal
standards for the trial court to apply in subsequent proceedings.
In the course of doing that, Judge Spaeth canvassed the principal
issues presented by the use of equitable restitution remedies in this
context. The opinion is a major contribution to the legal analysis
of this area. 0 2
On the fundamental issue of the extent of lender enrichment,
the court began with the principle that a lender is not enriched
unjustly if it has paid for the work done. Bound by its own 1979
10 1 One subcontractor prevailed in the trial court and was not party to the
appeal. Apparently, the trial court's judgment in favor of the subcontractor was
based upon its direct contact with the lender. The opinion of the Superior Court
indicates that the subcontractor prevailed because it showed that it had relied upon
the lender's assurances of financing. Gee, 279 Pa. Super. Ct. at 109, 420 A.2d at
1055. The Superior Court concluded that a claim for equitable relief exists when a
contractor has relied upon assurances of "adequate financing," but that these assur-
ances must have come from the lender itself. Id. at 123-25, 420 A.2d at 1062-63.
The court referred to this as a "reliance theory" of recovery. Id. at 125, 420 A.2d at
1063. Without more factual information concerning the nature of the assurances
of financing, it is difficult to determine whether the court went beyond the theories of
guaranty and promissory estoppel discussed supra in text accompanying notes 37-48.
102The opinion also discusses at length the related problem of subcontractors
and materialmen seeking recovery from the developer-owner when they have not
been paid by the prime contractor. Gee, 279 Pa. Super. Ct. at 114-20, 420 A.2d at
1057-60. The court considered this relevant because the lender, by foreclosing and
purchasing the property, had become owner. The court reviewed the case law
involving subcontractor claims and concluded that cases denying an equitable
restitution remedy had required proof of one or more of three elements: (1) that
an owner had engaged in wrongdoing or misrepresentation; (2) that a subcon-
tractor had exhausted a statutory or contractual remedy, and (3) that there was
some sort of direct contractual relationship between the subcontractor and the owner.
Id. at 117, 420 A.2d at 1059. The court concluded that each of these requirements
is inappropriate. Id. at 117-19, 420 A.2d at 1059-60. With respect to the last
element, the privity requirement, the court concluded: "The cases imposing this
requirement seem to us to ignore the fact that the essence of the doctrine of unjust
enrichment is that there is no direct relationship between the parties." Id. at 119,
420 A.2d at 1060.
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decision 103 in a similar factual setting, the court held that -when a
lender makes a construction loan advance on the basis of progress
in the work, it has "paid for" that work even though the payments
,do not reach the subcontractor whose supply of labor and materials
,constituted the evidence of progress. The court observed that loan
.advances against progress in the work might not be paid out at
:100% of the value of the work accomplished; and indicated that,
ito the extent that advances represent less than full value, a sub-
,,contractor might have a claim that the lender had been unjustly
-enriched. In the course of this analysis, the court rejected any
,notion that a -lender is unjustly enriched if it fails to police the
,distribution of loan funds to ensure that they are not diverted from
the project after coming into the control of the developer.
The court also addressed one of the most troublesome issues in
equitable lien suits: proof of the amount of enrichment. The court
apparently would limit proof of enrichment to situations in which
a lender has foreclosed on its mortgage and purchased the property
at the sheriff's sale.104 How the amount of enrichment might be
shown after lender foreclosure was left quite open by the court,
which said that a claimant must show "that in some manner the
lender's return at the sheriff's sale was enhanced because of the
subcontractor's work." -10 The court declared that proof of a dif-
ferential between the purchase price in the sheriff's sale and the
subsequent resale price was relevant but not conclusive evidence of
enrichment. 06
The court took note of the decisions in other states concerning
the difficulty of proving enrichment when a construction project
has been stopped before completion. Because the lender in Gee
had virtually completed' construction before the sheriff's sale, the
court declared that it did not have to choose between the Florida
view-that no relief is possible in partially completed projects-and
the opposite position of the California courts. The court indicated,
however, that it saw no reason why a claimant should necessarily
103 Myers-Macomber Eng'rs v. M.L.W. Constr. Corp., 271 Pa. Super. Ct. 484,
414 A.2d 357 (1979) (discussed in Gee, 279 Pa. Super. Ct. at 112-13, 420 A.2d at
1056-57).
O4oThe court was compelled to this conclusion by R.M. Shoemaker Co. v.
Southeastern Pa. Econ. Dev. Corp., 275 Pa. Super. Ct. 594, 419 A.2d 60 (1980)
(discussed in Gee, 279 Pa. Super. Ct. at 114 n.6, 420 A.2d at 1057 n.6).
105 Gee, 279 Pa. Super. Ct. at 113 n.5, 420 A.2d at 1057 n.5.
106 Id. at 122, 420 A.2d at 1062.
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be barred from proving enrichment because a project was
unfinished. 10
7
Following the accepted view of the nature of the equitable
remedies of constructive trust and equitable lien, the court empha-
sized that the claimant must demonstrate that there is a specific
and identifiable property, or res, to which the remedy could apply.
Notwithstanding the court's analysis of the nature of possible en-
richment of a lender through acquisition of title to a building that
had been enhanced in value by an unpaid subcontractor's work,
the discussion of the res centered on the unexpended construction
loan funds. The court considered three alternative scenarios that
could be proven:
[1] that [the lender] originally set up a $1,350,000 account
for the project and there are sufficient funds remaining in
that account to pay the appellants; [2] that the original
account had sufficient funds to pay the appellants [when
they performed their work] but no longer does; or [3]
that the original account was no longer in existence at the
time appellants performed their work and any further dis-
bursements made on the project afterwards were in a sepa-
rate account. 108
The court evaluated these possibilities and perceived no dif-
ficulties arising in connection with either the first or the second
scenario. If the requisite res exists or can be shown to have existed
at a critical time in the past, a court may grant the equitable remedy.
The court viewed the third possibility as "the greatest obstacle" to
recovery, 10 9 although it expressed doubt that evidence would even-
tually show this to have occurred in the case at hand.
C. Further Examination of Equitable Remedies
The Pennsylvania Superior Court's opinion in Gee v. Eberle,
building on the analyses of other courts, is a major attempt to come
to grips with the use of the concept of unjust enrichment to provide
some remedy to those who have supplied labor and materials to a
construction project but remain unpaid. The primary remedy for
such claimants, provided by statute, is the mechanic's lien. These
cases involve attempts to recover by an equitable remedy where
the statutory remedy has failed to satisfy the claimants. Typically,
107 Id. at 113 n.5, 420 A.2d at 1057 n.5.




mechanics' lien laws leave claimants unsatisfied when one of two
conditions exists: either a claimant did not take the steps necessary
to perfect a mechanic's lien, or a mechanic's lien was worthless as
a practical matter. For present purposes, the latter situation is of
primary interest.110
Given a statutory scheme explicitly designed to protect con-
tractors, subcontractors, and materialmen, it is reasonable to ask
how that arrangement failed in these cases. The circumstances of
the cases do not suggest any significant differences from transactional
patterns likely to occur regularly when construction ventures fail,
leaving suppliers of labor and materials unpaid. A basic premise
underlying mechanics' lien statutes is that the value of the labor and
materials is present in the building. How would that value dis-
appear when a construction lender forecloses on its mortgage? The
lender's claim is limited to the amount it has advanced to the de-
veloper of the project, plus interest and expenses of foreclosure.
It would therefore seem reasonable to expect that the proceeds of
foreclosure would satisfy all of these debts.
The proceeds of foreclosure sales may be inadequate because
foreclosure sales are an inherently flawed way to obtain the full
value of the property. Sheriff's sales are fundamentally different in
structure and dynamics from private sales. The former are auctions,
with no participation by the seller in setting terms likely to be
attractive to a particular buyer. A potential buyer must arrange
financing and a host of other matters before the auction, because
payment is due almost immediately thereafter. A prospective
bidder must therefore do substantial planning before the auction is
held, with no assurance of success. Not surprisingly, then, these
auction sales seldom realize the same price as a private sale con-
ducted by a seller with the goal of maximizing the return by skill-
ful marketing of the property.
Thus, that junior liens often are not paid from the proceeds of
foreclosure sales may be attributable to the nature of the procedure.
Any successful bidder in a sheriff's sale may obtain property that
can be resold privately for a higher price. It thus may be in-
appropriate to consider construction lenders who have bought prop-
110 Analysis of the former situation-when a supplier of labor or materials
seeks an equitable remedy to avoid the consequence of his failure to perfect a
mechanic's lien-would require an inquiry into whether the statutory scheme would
be undermined if claimants were allowed relief despite noncompliance with the
statutory requirements. Such an inquiry would necessarily involve detailed con-
sideration of mechanics' lien statutes, a subject beyond the scope of this article.
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erties at such sales as having been unjustly enriched at the expense
of the unpaid suppliers of labor and materials.
Carrying this point one step further, one might say that those
claimants with junior liens could participate in the foreclosure
sale to assure that the price is bid up high enough to cover the
claims of all lien holders. If such participation would not be feasi-
ble-and it probably is not in the typical case "'-the proper solution
would be to seek alteration by statute of the way in which property
liens are liquidated, not to provide for occasional, haphazard relief
to junior lien holders by equitable remedies against purchasers in
foreclosure sales. That problem, in other words, transcends the
circumstances of construction projects and includes any transaction
in which there are senior and junior liens in property being liqui-
dated by foreclosure processes.
The preceding analysis has ignored one important aspect of
these cases: that the claimants were not seeking to obtain relief by
realizing on the value in the building. There have been some
cases in which a claimant sought in effect to reverse the priority of
liens in the structure, so that the construction lender's interest
would be subordinated to those of suppliers of labor or materials."1
2
But the claimants' focus in the cases discussed above was to obtain
relief from the value in the unexpended loan funds. Cases that
have found unjust enrichment of lenders do not explain the cross-
over from the property supposedly enhanced in value-the build-
ing-to the property being subjected to an equitable remedy-the
unexpended construction loan funds.
Logically, to the extent that a lender has not paid out on the
loan commitment, its mortgage interest in the building would be
reduced. To the extent that a lender's lien in the building was
reduced, there would be possible excess value to support mechanics'
liens. Increasing the debt to be satisfied by the construction loan
mortgage would not necessarily have benefited unpaid suppliers of
labor or materials. Funds given over to the developer of a troubled
construction project might or might not eventually have reached
those who had worked on the building. Unless the lender were
responsible to oversee distribution of loan funds by the borrower,
111 Persons with claims to be satisfied out of the proceeds of a foreclosure sale
can bid up to the total of their claims without having to provide any new money.
The amount owing to any supplier of labor or materials is likely to be small in
relation to the value of the whole project and, therefore, not sufficient to permit it
to outbid large lienholders. Unless a mechanic's ienholder has access to sufficienf
resources to buy the property, it cannot afford to bid at such levels.
112 See, e.g., Apex Siding & Roofing Co. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
301 P.2d 352, 355 (Okla. 1956).
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and possibly by lower tiers of contractors, further loan payments by
the lender would not necessarily have benefited those claiming
relief in court.
A resolution must be sought, therefore, that takes into account,
as was central to all of these cases, that the defendant was a construc-
tion lender. The essence of the plaintiffs' claims in these cases may
be not a property interest in the unexpended loan funds, but rather
a contract-based right to enforce the loan commitments. Analysis
in terms of the property remedies of equitable lien and constructive
trust masks the privity problem that arises with a contract theory,
under which lenders would be personally liable.
As the facts of the Gee case well illustrate, pursuit of a res in
the construction loan funds is unsatisfying. What claimants were
seeking to enforce in Gee was the lender's original commitment.
The outcome should not turn on whether the lender created a sepa-
rate bank account specially for that commitment, nor on whether it
had a balance on any given day.113 Suppliers of labor and materials
are not likely to have any knowledge of the bookkeeping practices
of lenders. Rather, it is the commitment itself that matters. En-
forcement of that commitment reaches beyond the property concepts
of equitable lien and constructive trust.
D. Contractual Claims Against Construction Lenders
If contract rights are the real basis for claims aimed at undis-
bursed loan funds, it is necessary to examine the nature of the
contract theories to be applied. One possible line of analysis is to
treat construction lenders as more directly connected with those
who supply labor or materials.
There are indications in some court decisions that construction
lenders are not viewed as merely sources of secured credit for de-
velopers, but are seen as more broadly integrated into the risk-taking
role of the enterprise. Consider the view expressed recently by
the Court of Appeals of New York about the interplay among bank,
borrower, and suppliers of labor and materials in a construction
project:
113 In Miller v. Mountain View Say. & Loan Ass'n, 238 Cal. App. 2d 644, 663,
48 Cal. Bptr. 278, 291 (1965), the court indicated that a lender's turning over of
the loan funds to a disbursement agent was significant. Even though a fund is
held in escrow by a second party, the escrow agent's freedom to disburse money
therefrom would be controlled by the terms of the arrangement. Such terms, pre-
sumably, would be set by the lender. If so, the effect could be as much control
of payments as would be found if the lender made payments directly. See, e.g.,
Morgen-Oswood & Assocs., Inc. v. Continental Mortgage Investors, 323 So. 2d 684,
685 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
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The bank's position is pivotal; without its financial sup-
port, contractors might be- unwilling to risk their resources
in a project run by a developer of perhaps questionable.
soundness. Frequently, the bank is a working partner in
the deal in that it co-ordinates its advances to the developer
with the actual progress of the construction; at times, it may
even bargain for an option to convert its mortgage into an
equity interest. 114
The New York court's categorization of the lender as a "working
partner" who may later become sole holder of the "equity interest"
moves a lender much closer, in a contractual sense, to others dealing
with the enterprise.
The California District Court of Appeal has put the matter
somewhat differently: "The construction loan substitutes the
lender's promised money for the real property which his prior deed
of trust generally renders inadequate for any realistic relief." "r In
other words, the original investment by an owner-developer would,
absent the construction lender's mortgage, provide a cushion to
ensure payment of suppliers of labor and materials. The mechanics'
lien works optimally for claimants when the owner of property, in
order to protect a significant ownership interest, is compelled to
compensate unpaid suppliers of labor or materials.
An example of circumstances in which it is reasonable to col-
lapse a series of what appear to be contract relationships into a
single enterprise or entity is found in the quasi-public housing
developments authorized by the National Housing Act." 6 Federal
courts have decided a number of cases in which prime contractors
have been allowed to recover from the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD), even though contractually HUD was
several steps removed from the contractors' agreements with the
developers.
Section 236 of the National Housing Act 1 7 authorizes an
unusual hybrid of private and public construction. In form, the
major participants in such a venture are private entities: private
firms are engaged as prime contractors, private lending institutions
provide construction loans, and the owners are ostensibly private
"14 Nanuet Nat'l Bank v. Erikson Terrace, Inc., 47 N.Y.2d 243, 248, 391 N.E.2d
983, 986, 417 N.Y.S.2d 901, 904 (1979).
"5 Miller v. Mountain View Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 238 Cal. App. 2d 644, 658,
48 Cal. Rptr. 278, 288 (1965).
116 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1707-1715z-11 (1976).
117 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (1976).
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corporations. But these owners in reality are nonprofit, no-asset
corporations specially created for purposes of the section 236 proj-
ects. Contracting firms are induced to enter into construction con-
tracts with these owners because lenders provide 100% of the con-
struction costs. Lenders agree to these extraordinary commitments
because they are fully insured by the federal government.
The motivating force behind these developments has been HUD.
HUD carefully avoids direct dealing with the owners and general
contractors, but keeps a tight control on the purse strings. Con-
struction loan funds are not disbursed until a HUD official approves.
HUD also can cancel the mortgage insurance. When a project fails,
the lender extricates itself by assigning the debt and mortgage to
HUD or by foreclosing on the mortgage and delivering title to
HUD. By either path, HUD is substituted for the lender. Prime
contractors have recovered against HUD in a number of recent
cases involving troubled section 236 projects.118 In two earlier deci-
sions, courts of appeals held that prime contractors had equitable
liens in undisbursed construction loan funds.119 The most recent
decision in favor of a contractor, however, eschewed the equitable
lien remedy and employed, instead, the contract remedy of quan-
tum meruit. The facts and reasoning of that case are worth
reviewing.
In S.S. Silberblatt, Inc. v. East Harlem Pilot Block-Building 1
Housing Development Fund Co., 20 about ninety percent of the
work on a 650-unit apartment complex had been finished when
building stopped. The lender, relying on the ground that the work
had not been finished within the scheduled time, refused to make
any further advances on the construction loan. The owner in turn
dishonored the contractor's request for a monthly payment, and
the contractor suspended work. The ensuing litigation involved
the builder and HUD. The government argued that, as assignee
under the loan agreement, it was entitled to the remaining loan
funds to pay for completion of the project. The contractor denied
it was making a claim on a third party beneficiary theory, and did
I's The leading cases allowing recovery are: S.S. Silberblatt, Inc. v. East Harlem
Pilot Block-Bldg. 1 Hous. Dev. Fund Co., 608 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1979); Spring
Constr. Co. v. Harris, 562 F.2d 933 (4th Cir. 1977); Trans-Bay Eng'rs & Builders,
Inc. v. Hills, 551 F.2d 370 (D.C. Cir. 1976). But see Marcus Garvey Square, Inc.
v. Winston Burnett Constr. Co., 595 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1979).
119 Trans-Bay Eng'rs & Builders, Inc. v. Hills, 551 F.2d 370, 381 (D.C. Cir.
1976); Spring Constr. Co. v. Harris, 562 F.2d 933, 938 (4th Cir. 1977). The
courts also relied upon third-party-beneficiary concepts.
120 608 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1979).
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not seek an equitable lien in the retainages and undisbursed loan
funds. Rather, the contractor contended, and the court of appeals
agreed, that the fundamental claim in cases of this kind is unjust
enrichment, for which an equitable lien is one, but not the exclu-
sive, remedy. The contractor sought to recover in quantum meruit.
The advantage of that remedy over an equitable lien (and over a
third-party-beneficiary claim) is that it permits possible recovery
of an amount greater than the retainages and undisbursed loan
funds.
The court of appeals explained its use of quantum meruit in
favor of the unpaid contractor: "An equitable lien represents but
one of several methods which courts in law and equity have devised
to remedy unjust enrichment. . . ,, 121 Accordingly, the court held
that:
[T]he availability of a remedy to appellant is not dependent
upon the existence of undisbursed loan proceeds as a res
that may be subject to an equitable lien. If appellant
should succeed at trial in establishing its claim of unjust
enrichment, it would be awarded a judgment for the
amount owed . . . . and the court, in-the exercise of its
broad equity power, could grant such restitutionary relief
as might be equitable under the circumstances. 122
In the circumstances of these federal cases, once one looks
behind the facade of formal contract relations among a nominal
developer, a lender, and HUD, it is reasonable to conclude that the
real developer included HUD. Recognition of HUD's role might
even allow a prime contractor to enforce against HUD the rights
,created in the contract between the contractor and the nominal
developer. This could be done, if a claimant so chose, in quantum
meruit, but it also could be done by an action for breach of the
express contract. Thus, telescoping of the contractual relationships
may bring a prime contractor into privity with what had appeared
to be a remote party whose function was to insure the construction
lender's risk exposure.
Similarly, in entirely private construction projects, it may be
possible to justify treatment of a lender as a "working partner" and,
hence, as involved in the contractual commitments of a developer.
Justification might be sought by examining whether a developer
is adequately capitalized. When loan funds provide 100%, of a




development's costs, as in the quasi-public housing projects,. there
is no investment by the developer. Undercapitalization is one of
the factors used in piercing the corporate veil to allow contract
relief from a shareholder.123 It may be that the debt-equity ratio
in construction ventures should determine, at least in part, whether
recovery may be had from a lender. In the private construction
cases discussed in this Article, the opinions do not give a clear
enough statement of the relevant facts to permit detailed review.
Although there are suggestions that some courts may have been
influenced by the minimal investments of developers, 124 these cases
do not provide a basis for further inquiry into the particular sets
of circumstances that would warrant treatment of a construction
lender as a "working partner" of a developer.
Alignment of a construction lender as the "working partner"
of a developer, when justified, does provide a theoretical basis for
resolving some of the questions of contract privity raised by con-
tract claims against construction lenders. A useful analogy can be
drawn from the law of partnerships,, under which every partner is
liable for the contractual obligations undertaken by any partner
for the partnership entity. Perhaps an even more apt analogy might
be found in the law of joint ventures. The analogy can be extended
further by using the concept of the limited partnership to represent
the limited role of construction lenders, who ordinarily do not
participate in the risks of profit or loss in the projects and whose
maximum financial exposure is expressed by the amount of the
loan commitments.
The partnership or joint venture analogy is advantageous for
those who have dealt directly with an authorized representative of
the entity. Thus, persons who have contracted with the developer
might be able to establish that they are also in contract privity with
the construction lender. Normally, only the prime contractor could
make such a claim. In some projects, however, developers act as.
123 Gallagher v. Reconco Builders, Inc., 91 IM. App. 3d 999, 415 N.E.2d 56(
(1980); Yacker v. Weiner, 109 N.J. Super. 351, 263 A.2d 188 (Ch. Div. 1970), aff'd,
114 N.J. Super. 526, 277 A.2d 417 (App. Div. 1971). See generally H. B.AwNTur-E,
BAL.LANTzm ON CoRIponxroNs §§ 129, 130 (rev. ed. 1946); 1 W. FLETcm,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAw OF- PIVATE CoRuoRArroNs §§ 41, 44 (perm. rev. ed.
1974); Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEx. L. REv. 979 (1971); Comment,
Disregarding the Corporate Entity: Contract Claims, 28 Omo ST. L.J. 441 (1967)-
124 See, e.g., Pacific Ready Cut Homes, Inc. v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 216
Cal. 447, 451, 14 P.2d 510, 511 (1932) (owner insolvent when venture began);
McBain v. Santa Clara Say. & Loan Ass'n, 241 Cal. App. 2d 829, 841, 51 Cal.
Rptr. 78, 86 (1966) (appellants faced the precarious situation of contributing
labor and materials to property heavily encumbered by both a purchase money
loan and a construction loan).
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their own prime contractors and deal directly with suppliers of labor
and materials. All such suppliers could enforce their contract
claims against the entity, although with liability limited to the
lender's maximum exposure in any suit against a lender.
It is fortuitous, perhaps, that most of the cases in which courts
have granted relief to unpaid claimants have involved only what
might be called a single privity problem. These claimants were,
by ordinary contract principles, in privity with the developers, and
the one privity problem thus was to find justification for pursuing
the claims against the remote lenders.125 Only two of the cases in
which claimants were allowed to recover involved double privity
problems, in the sense that the claimants had no contract privity
with either the developer or the construction lender.126
IV. CONCLUSION
The idea that construction lenders can be held liable to
suppliers of labor and materials has received enough support from
courts and legislatures to become respectable. Some of the judicial
developments, however, still lack an adequately principled rationale.
125 See Pacific Ready Cut Homes, Inc. v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 216 Cal. 447,
14 P.2d 510 (1932); McBain v. Santa Clara Say. & Loan Ass'n, 241 Cal. App. 2d
829, 51 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1966); Miller v. Mountain View Say. & Loan Ass'n, 238
Cal. App. 2d 644, 48 Cal. Rptr. 278 (1965); Gee v. Eberle, 279 Pa. Super. 101,
420 A.2d 1050 (1980).
126The courts' opinions in the two exceptions provide less than adequate
information concerning why the prime contractors defaulted in their obligations to
the suppliers of labor and materials. The court in Anglo-American Sao. & Loan
Ass'n v. Campbell noted only that the prime contractor had "failed." 13 App.
D.C. 581, 586-87 (D.C. Cir. 1898). The second case, Doud Lumber Co. v.
Guaranty Say. & Loan Ass'n, does not provide even this much information, though
the court noted that the materialman and the general contractor had dealt with
each other previously, and that the general contractor was in arrears on payments
to the supplier from those dealings. 254 Cal. App. 2d 585, 587, 60 Cal. Rptr. 94,
95 (1967). (This fact was mentioned to explain the supplier's precontract inquiry
into the existence of a construction loan.) With so little factual basis, useful
analysis of these decisions is not possible.
In Anglo-American Say. & Loan Ass'n, the earliest case to employ the equitable
lien remedy, the court concluded that the lender had withheld the final installment
of the construction loan without justification under the loan agreement. 13 App.
D.C. at 602. This made it possible to find the lender unjustly enriched by reference
to its contract commitment. None of the later cases found that a lender was in
breach of its loan commitment.
In Doud Lumber Co., the court declared that the lender, with apparent sophis-
tication in commercial financing, had occupied a privileged, secure, and dominant
position in the arrangements, had had full control of the funds, and yet had
neglected to protect its position. 254 Cal. App. 2d at 589-90, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 97.
The court may have meant that the lender should have called for receipted bills,
issued checks to joint payees, or used other fiscal controls to insure that payments
reached subcontractors and materialmen, see Miller, 238 Cal. App. 2d at 258-59,
48 Cal. Rptr. at 288, but there is no basis in the opinion for concluding that such
action would be more than a prudent safeguard for a lender's own protection.
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When particular facts show lenders entering into commitments
that run to suppliers of labor and materials, whether by direct com-
munication or by third-party-beneficiary contracts, accepted con-
tract doctrines can be applied. When these elements are lacking,
some courts have used the restitution remedies of equitable lien or
constructive trust in favor of unpaid contractors, subcontractors, and
materialmen. These remedies, derived from property concepts, do
not fit comfortably with the claims made, which essentially seek to
hold construction lenders personally liable under their loan
commitments.
An alternative remedial basis, founded on contract principles,
may offer a better rationale, at least for the claims of those parties
who have dealt with the developer. There may be sound basis in
many projects to characterize the construction lender as part of the
developer's team, rather than as an independent entity merely sup-
plying secured credit. This may be the most principled path to-
ward establishing the normative standards for construction lender
liability, and would meld well with the growing body of contract
law that is extending the bounds of traditional privity concepts.
